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Criminal Courts and Tribunals
International Criminal Court
ICC to Determine Jurisdiction
Over Libyan Officials and Set
Precedent on Court’s Scope
Libya has challenged the admissibility
of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC)
case against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and
Abdullah al-Senussi on charges of crimes
against humanity on the grounds that the
State is capable of conducting a fair trial
according to its domestic law and is in the
process of building a case against both men.
The May 2012 motion submitted on behalf
of the government of Libya requested an
oral hearing on the admissibility challenge pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome
Statute by arguing that the case against
the former officials in the government
of Muammar Qaddafi should be deemed
inadmissible because domestic investigations and prosecutions are underway in
Libya. The expected ruling by the Pre-Trial
Chamber on admissibility in this case could
set important precedents on both admissibility and the scope of ICC jurisdiction.
If the Court allows Libya to carry out the
trials of both defendants domestically, the
result would strengthen the ability of States
to challenge admissibility and make it more
difficult for the ICC to bring international
criminals to justice.
Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute,
the ICC has jurisdiction over serious
crimes that concern the international community as a whole, including genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Prosecutors charged both Saif al-Islam
Qaddafi and al-Senussi with two counts
of crimes against humanity in connection
with the murder and persecution of Libyan
civilians during the 2011 popular uprising. However, the Court may only exercise
this jurisdiction in accordance with the
principle of complementarity. The principle, as stated in the Preamble and in
Article 1 of the Rome Statute, declares that
ICC jurisdiction exists alongside national
criminal jurisdictions and must defer to
ongoing national prosecutions and investigations. Article 19 allows a State to
challenge admissibility if that State is
actively investigating and prosecuting the

defendant for the crimes alleged by the
Prosecutor of the ICC.
Libya’s challenge invoked both its
right to dispute the admissibility of the
case under Article 19(2)(b) and the principle of complementarity under Article 1.
Libya has held Qaddafi in custody since
November 2011, and Mauritania recently
extradited al-Senussi to Libya after capturing him in March 2012. Libyan officials
have stated repeatedly that the two men
will be tried in Libya under Libyan law
with the possibility of facing the death
penalty if convicted.
In response to Libya’s challenge, the
ICC Office of the Prosecution noted that
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute,
admissibility-challenge determinations
are made using a two-step process. First,
national investigation and prosecution must
be ongoing. Second, those proceedings
must be “genuine.” The challenging State
must demonstrate that the proceedings are
“genuine” within the meaning of Article
17(1)(a) by showing that the proceedings
are not merely a pretense designed to
shield the accused or guarantee impunity,
and under Article 19 that the State is able
to advance the proceedings in accordance
with Article 17(3). Under Article 17(3)
the Court will examine whether there has
been a substantial collapse of the judicial
system and if the State is unable to conduct
investigations and trials. The prosecution
ultimately agreed that Libya has taken genuine steps toward investigating the charges
against Qaddafi and al-Senussi but also
expressed concern about Libya’s ability to
advance the case in domestic courts. The
prosecution thus requested more information from Libya about its ability to
advance the case domestically. The PreTrial Chamber responded in October 2012
and requested public hearings in order to
make a final decision on Libya’s ability to
advance domestic prosecution.
The concepts of admissibility and
complementarity in international criminal
law remain debated among human rights
scholars and advocates. Many argue that
the ICC should be regarded as only a court
of last resort; Libya should be allowed to
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conduct a domestic prosecution. Others
claim Libya’s justice system is not currently capable of carrying out a free and
fair trial, so a domestic trial would result in
further human rights violations and a delay
in justice for the civilian victims of the
Libyan uprising. The ICC’s questionable
jurisdiction over Qaddafi and al-Senussi
highlights one of the biggest challenges
the ICC has faced in its few years of existence: the difficult task of balancing state
sovereignty with accountability for human
rights abuses. If Libya submits both men to
the ICC, it would be a symbolic milestone
for the Court’s authority and would bolster
or perhaps legitimize that authority in the
eyes of the international community.

First Person Convicted by ICC
Appeals Conviction and Sentence
In an historic moment for the
International Criminal Court (ICC),
Thomas Lubanga became the first person
convicted by the Court. Lubanga was found
guilty of enlisting and conscripting child
soldiers in an armed conflict on the side
of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment.
While both the defense and the prosecution are appealing the sentence, the ICC’s
verdict and sentencing in Lubanga’s case
is a landmark that monumentally bolsters
the accountability of the court. However, a
fight over the conviction and the sentencing procedure could have serious consequences for not only the other Congolese
nationals currently still on trial at the ICC
but also for all future cases brought against
alleged perpetrators of war crimes.
Following Lubanga’s March 14, 2012,
conviction, at the request of the defense
and pursuant to the Rome Statute Article
76(2), the Trial Chamber held a separate
sentencing hearing. On July 10, 2012, at
the conclusion of the hearing, the ICC
Trial Chamber I sentenced Lubanga. The
time from Lubanga’s arrest on March 16,
2006, until the date of his sentencing was
deducted from his sentence, resulting in
less than eight years’ further imprisonment
for his crimes. Lawyers on both sides of
the judgment are not satisfied with the

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8
Chamber’s decision. On October 3, 2012,
Lubanga’s lawyers filed both a notice
to appeal the guilty verdict and a notice
of intent to have his sentence canceled
or reduced. On the same day, the prosecution likewise informed the Chamber of
its intent to appeal the sentence seeking
a harsher punishment.
In the Chamber’s sentencing decision
analysis, it looked to the applicable articles of the Rome Statute as well as the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for guidance. Specifically, Article 76(1) of the
Statute states that the Trial Chamber shall
decide the appropriate sentence, taking
into account “the evidence presented and
[the] submissions made during the trial
that are relevant to the sentence.” Article
77(1) allows for sentencing up to a maximum of thirty years except in cases when
a term of life imprisonment is “justified
by the extreme gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Most importantly, Article
78 together with Rule 145 gives guidelines for determining sentences. Article
78(1) says the sentence must take into
account “the gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted
person.” Rule 145(1)(a) and (b) state that
the sentence must reflect the culpability
of the convicted person and the Chamber
needs to balance all of the relevant factors,
including aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances.
In applying these guidelines, the Trial
Chamber identified six relevant factors
that it took into account in determining
Lubanga’s sentence: the gravity of the
crime and resulting damage, the largescale and widespread nature of the crimes,
the degree of participation and intent
of the convicted person, the individual
circumstances of the convicted person,
aggravating circumstances, and mitigating
circumstances. The Trial Chamber found
that while the involvement of children
was widespread, the Chamber could not
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
a precise number or proportion of the
recruits were under the age of fifteen. The
Trial Chamber found that as President
and Commander-in-Chief of the UPC,
Lubanga encouraged children to enlist
and even personally employed bodyguards
under the age of fifteen. Additionally, the
Trial Chamber determined that Lubanga,
an intelligent and well-educated person,
understood the seriousness of the crimes

committed. The Trial Chamber considered several claims of aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecution, including punishment of the children while under
Lubanga’s control, alleged sexual violence
against the child soldiers, and commission
of the crime when the victims were particularly defenseless, but each was dismissed.
Finally, although the Trial Chamber accepted
Lubanga’s cooperation with the Court as a
mitigating factor, the Chamber dismissed the
defense’s argument that Lubanga’s actions
during the conflict were necessary to achieve
demobilization and peace.

The wartime leader of the Serbcontrolled area of Bosnia, known as
Republika Srpska, has been on trial since
2009 for charges of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder, and forced
relocation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats,
crimes committed between 1992 and 1996.
Karadzic, who is representing himself,
pled not guilty to all charges against him.
The Chamber maintains that, although the
prosecution has repeatedly failed to produce evidence on time, the judges ensured
that the defense had ample time to review
evidence and prepare responses.

Article 81 of the Rome Statute stipulates the grounds for appeal of a conviction or sentence. Lubanga may appeal his
conviction on the grounds of procedural
error, error of fact, error of law, or on a
ground of unfairness or unreliability of
the proceedings or decision. According
to Article 81(2), however, either side may
appeal a sentence if it is disproportionate to the crime. A reversal of Lubanga’s
landmark conviction or a reduction of his
sentence would likely raise human rights
concerns about the ICC’s ability to achieve
accountability for victims and to eliminate
impunity. However, an increase in his
sentence may also raise concerns of overly
harsh punishments, especially in setting
precedent for future sentencing, including those for convictions for genocide and
crimes against humanity.

The case’s central allegation is that
Karadzic was involved in planning both the
1995 Srebrenica massacre—resulting in the
death of 8,000 Muslim men and boys—and
the forty four-month siege of Sarajevo—
resulting in 12,000 deaths. After the United
Nations Security Council instituted the
ICTY, Karadzic remained at large for thirteen years before his July 2008 arrest.

Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Internationalized Criminal
Tribunals
Karadzic’s Right to a Fair Trial:
Protecting the Accused in the ICTY
The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial
Chamber rejected Radovan Karadzic’s
motion for retrial on August 13, 2012. The
former Serbian leader, accused of involvement in the Srebrenica massacre, based
his motion on the prosecution’s repeated
failure to submit evidence in a timely
fashion. The ICTY held that while the
prosecution submitted evidence in violation of the rules of procedure, the delay did
not prejudice the defense’s case or deny the
defendant his right to fair trial.
49

Karadzic’s motion for a retrial accused
the prosecution of failing to disclose 406
witness statements and other testimonies
in a timely fashion in addition to committing “numerous” violations of the rules of
disclosure. Since the trial began in 2009,
Karadzic has filed more than seventy
motions alleging various late or improper
disclosures of evidence. In several of such
instances, the ICTY Trial Chamber stopped
trial proceedings and provided Karadzic
with sufficient time to review documents
or other late evidence. Despite the prosecutors’ repeated infractions of the ICTY’s
rules of procedure, the Trial Chamber’s
Judge Kwon, in the August decision, ruled
that while the actions “put the prosecution
in a bad light,” Karadzic had not “suffered
damage from this violation,” and thus it
was not necessary to grant him a new trial.
As the ICTY has not established a
standard to determine fairness of a trial,
the Chamber looked to general protections
of the rights of the accused as outlined in
the Statute of the Tribunal. Articles 20(1),
21(4)(c) and 21(4)(b) protect the accused’s
right to be tried expeditiously, without
undue delay, with full respect of his or her
rights (as enumerated in other international
treaties, such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights), and to have
“adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense.” The Chamber also
considered its own procedural rulings in
each of Karadzic’s previous complaints
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about the Prosecutor’s failure to disclose.
The Chamber explained its decision by
applying the general articles delineated in
the Statute and looking at the cumulative
effect of the repeated delays of disclosure.
Judge Kwon’s decision stated that the nature
of the evidence was neither sufficiently different from other evidence nor substantial
enough to prejudice Karadzic’s case.
In reaching its decision, the Chamber’s
central question was how the defendant’s
procedural rights relate to whether the
defendant has received a fair trial. The
ICTY has often faced such questions and
has applied Judge Shahabuddeen’s statement in his Separate Opinion on Slobodan
Milošević that “the fairness of a trial need
not require perfection in every detail. The
essential question is whether the accused
has had a fair chance of dealing with
the allegations against him.” In light of
the prosecution’s repeated missteps, the
question of whether Karadzic receives a
sufficiently “fair chance” of addressing
the charges against him broadens because
of his refusal to accept the advice of
legal counsel. Although the Chamber has
undertaken “active management” of the
trial to protect Karadzic’s rights when
the prosecution has violated the rules of
disclosure, the court is unable to force
Karadzic to listen to or take the advice of
his court-appointed standby legal adviser.
As the trial moves forward, the Chamber
must continue to balance the often-competing interests in protecting the rights of
the accused, helping Karadzic navigate
his defense without legal representation,
and ensuring that the prosecution does not
infringe on Karadzic’s right to a fair trial.

International Criminal Tribunal
for Cybercrime and Human Rights
As communication and commerce shift
into the cyberworld, some states have
questioned criminal law’s ability to protect commercial and public interests.
In his “Recommendations for Potential
New Global Legal Mechanisms Against
Global Cyberattacks and Other Global
Cybercrimes,” Norwegian Judge Stein
Schjolberg, Chairman of the global HighLevel Experts Group on Cybersecurity,
called for increased enforcement mechanisms, writing that “without an international court or tribunal for dealing with
the most serious cybercrimes of global
concern, many serious cyberattacks will
go unpunished.” Schjolberg argued that

the 2001 Council of Europe Convention
on Cybercrime (Cybercrime Convention),
although open internationally for ratification, is insufficient to address all
global cybercrimes. The crimes of concern to Schjolberg in his draft Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal
for Cyberspace (ICTC) include attacks
on communication infrastructure, illegal access, forgery, identity theft, and
fraud—all of which reflect the Cybercrime
Convention’s structure and delineated
crimes. For Schjolberg, however, the
Cybercrime Convention falls short because
it lacks an authoritative body capable of
enforcing the laws in the realm of international criminal law. For non-European
countries, the Cybercrime Convention
does not address Internet-based crimes
that are common among developing and
transitional nations.
In the absence of an international tribunal, states have addressed cybercrime
through domestic legislation. Recently,
the Philippines’s legislature passed a
law reflecting acts criminalized in the
Cybercrime Convention; however, the
legislation included an additional crime
that, according to that nation’s Supreme
Court, violates citizens’ human rights. The
Filipino law expanded the definition of
criminal libel to include statements made
on the Internet and increased the penalty
for criminal libel to six years’ imprisonment. In 2011, the United Nations’ Human
Rights Committee declared that imprisonment of Filipino journalists for libel
violated Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). In keeping with this ruling, the
Filipino Supreme Court determined that
the new law violates the human rights to
freedom of expression and opinion.
Like the Cybercrime Convention, Judge
Schjolberg’s recommendation garnered
criticism for being too Euro-centric and
ignoring the unique threats and concerns
that developing nations face. Although the
Cybercrime Convention is open for ratification globally, the treaty is only widely
accepted within Europe, and the only nonMember State parties are the United States
and Japan. When Brazil considered signing the Convention, it eventually decided
not to because the intellectual propertycrime provisions were not compatible with
Brazil’s developing and emerging market. Such emerging markets, which also
include China, Russia, India, and Turkey,
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are often the most vulnerable and at the
highest risk for cyberthreats.
The draft ICTC statute claims to outline the most serious crimes that would
trigger the tribunal’s jurisdiction over individuals, but it does not include any Internet
crimes that implicate human rights, and it
leaves conspicuously absent any mention
of freedom of speech. Judge Schjolberg
recommended including the ICTC as a
specialized bench within the International
Criminal Court (ICC), a body established
to address, as stated in the Rome Statute
establishing the Court, the “most serious
crimes of concern to the international
community,” including genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. It is
unclear how the defined cybercrimes meet
the ICC’s jurisdiction, which generally
covers the gravest breaches of human
rights. The proposed tribunal also does not
address the prominent cybercrime discussion occurring among international bodies,
states, and non-governmental organizations, a discussion that focuses on limitations to speech online, the vulnerability
of individuals’ human rights to freedom
of expression, and speech included within
cybercrime legislation. Furthermore, creating an international court tasked with prosecuting individuals accused of committing
cybercrimes, particularly without addressing the human rights implications of such
crimes and the legislation countries pass
to prevent them, increases vulnerability of
individuals to domestic criminal laws that
include additional provisions that restrict
human rights.
A 2012 Freedom House study on
Internet freedoms and human rights found
that twenty of the forty seven studied
countries experienced a loss in Internet
freedom since January 2011. In June 2012,
the UN Human Rights Council passed a
resolution affirming Internet freedom as
a human right. By proposing a tribunal
that addresses only economic or privacybased crimes on the Internet, Schjolberg
ignores one of the most prominent concerns regarding Internet safety and opens
the door to repressive state governments
to adopt laws in compliance with the
proposed tribunal that may easily include
clauses and provisions that overstep citizens’ rights to Internet access, freedom of
expression, and access to information.
Critics argue that the only way to establish a global governing document or body
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to regulate cybercrime is to allow input and
ownership of nations from throughout the
world. It may be wasteful to throw away the
successes of the Cybercrime Convention
and Judge Schjolberg’s Recommendations,

but redrafting and amending the treaty to
include representatives from developing
and developed nations alike would add
legitimacy to the process.

Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Judgment Summaries:
International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda

of civilians, rapes at a Kigali roadblock,
the sexual assault of the Prime Minister,
the torture of Alphonse Kabiligi, and
the sheparding of refugees to Gikondo
Parish, where the refugees were killed.

errors with regard to the assessment of
the evidence, including the credibility
of several witnesses; inaccurate characterization of the mode of responsibility;
errors regarding how the Trial Chamber
defined the elements of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, and
errors relating to cumulative convictions
and sentencing.

Théoneste Bagosora and Anatole
Nsengiyumva v. The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-98-41-A
On December 14, 2011, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
judgment in the case against Théoneste
Bagosora and Anatole Nsengiyumva,
two of the four defendants tried in the
Bagosora et. al. case, affirming some
but not all charges. Both before and
during the 1994 conflict, the men held
high-ranking positions in the Rwandan
Government: Nsengiyumva served as the
Commander of the Gisenyi Operational
Sector and Bagosora served as Directeur
de Cabinet for the Ministry of Defense.
Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals
Chamber found that Bagosora held
effective control over the Rwandan
Armed Forces from April 6–9, 1994,
because the President was killed and
the Minister of Defense was out of the
country. The Prosecution alleged that
both Nsengiyumva and Bagosora were
responsible for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, either through
directly ordering the attacks, or pursuant
to the doctrine of superior responsibility.
In its judgment of December 18,
2008, Trial Chamber I found Bagosora
guilty of genocide, six counts of crimes
against humanity (comprising extermination, rape, persecution, two counts of
murder, and other inhumane acts), and
three counts of war crimes (two counts of
violence to life and one count of outrages
upon personal dignity). Specifically, the
Trial Chamber held Bagosora responsible for ordering the murder of Augustin
Maharangari, as well as for ordering
killings, rapes, and other crimes committed from April 6-9, 1994, at Kigali roadblocks. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber
found Bagosora guilty of superior liability for additional crimes, including the
killings of the Prime Minister, the killings

The Trial Chamber found co-defendant Nsengiyumva guilty of genocide,
four counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, persecution
and inhumane acts), and one war crime
(violence to life). Specifically, the Trial
Chamber found Nsengiyumva guilty of
ordering and guilty as a superior for the
killings of individuals, as well as ordering the murder of Alphonse Kabiligi. The
Trial Chamber also found Nsengiyumva
aided and abetted the killings in the
Bisesero area of Kibuye prefecture by
sending militiamen to participate.
On appeal, Bagosora raised six challenges to his conviction and sentence.
Bagosora alleged errors with regard to
the Trial Chamber’s finding that he exercised effective control over subordinates,
fair trial violations with regard to the
enforcement of a subpoena, errors in the
assessment of the evidence, errors of law
regarding the theory of superior responsibility, and specific errors regarding
his conviction for the sexual assault of
Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and his
role in crimes committed at roadblocks
in Kigali, as well as errors related to
cumulative convictions and sentencing.
Co-defendant Nsengiyumva raised fifteen challenges to his conviction and sentence. He alleged that the Trial Judgment
was void due to the resignation of Judge
Reddy before the release of the written judgment and raised several grounds
relating to the fairness of the proceedings, including the right to an initial
appearance without delay, the right to
be tried without undue delay, the right to
be present at trial, the fact that the Trial
Judgment did not admit some of the evidence he submitted, and errors relating to
disclosure. He also alleged errors regarding insufficiencies in the indictment and
the burden of proof upon the prosecution;
insufficiency of the proof against him;
51

The Appeals Chamber affirmed
Bagosora’s convictions for genocide,
extermination and persecution as crimes
against humanity, and violence to life
as a war crime in relation to killings
at Kibagabaga Mosque, Kabeza, the
Saint Josephite Centre, Karama Hill,
Kibagabaga Catholic Church, Gikondo
Parish, and Kigali-area roadblocks;
extermination and persecution as
crimes against humanity; and violence
to life as a war crime in relation to
the killings of Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, Joseph Kavaruganda,
Frédéric Nzamurambaho, Landoald
Ndasingwa, and Faustin Rucogoza, as
well as the killings at Centre Christus;
murder as a crime against humanity
and violence to life as a war crime in
relation to the killings of the Belgian
peacekeepers who were still alive when
Bagosora visited Camp Kigali; rape as
a crime against humanity in relation to
the rapes committed at Kigali area roadblocks, the Saint Josephite Centre, and
Gikondo Parish; other inhumane acts as
crimes against humanity in relation to the
stripping of female refugees at the Saint
Josephite Centre and the “sheparding”
of refugees to Gikondo Parish, where
they were killed; outrages upon personal
dignity as a war crime in relation to the
rapes at Kigali area roadblocks, the Saint
Josephite Centre, and Gikondo Parish;
and murder as a crime against humanity.
Notably, however, the Appeals
Chamber reversed Bagosora’s convictions for several charges including, his
convictions for crimes against humanity
and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Additional Protocol II (war crimes)
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in relation to the killings of Alphonse
Kabiligi, Augustin Maharangari, and the
Belgian peacekeepers murdered before
his visit to Camp Kigali, as well as his
convictions for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes in relation to
the killings at Nyundo Parish on April
7-9, 1994. The Appeals Chamber also
reversed his convictions for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes
in relation to the killings in Gisenyi
town on April 7, 1994, and at Mudende
University on April 8, 1994, and his
conviction for other inhumane acts
as a crime against humanity in relation to the defilement of the corpse of
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana.
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber set
aside his conviction under individual
criminal responsibility for ordering
the crimes committed at Kigali roadblocks while affirming his conviction
under superior responsibility for those
same offenses. Acting proprio motu, the
Appeals Chamber reversed Bagosora’s
conviction for murder as a crime against
humanity—reasoning it was impermissibly cumulative given his conviction for
extermination as a crime against humanity—and set aside his sentence of life
in prison, replacing it with a sentence of
thirty-five years’ imprisonment.
In the case of Nsengiyumva, the
Appeals Chamber affirmed his convictions for genocide, extermination and
persecution as crimes against humanity,
and violence to life as a war crime for
the killings in Gisenyi town on April 7,
1994. However, the Chamber reversed his
convictions for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes for aiding and
abetting the crimes at Bisesero in the
second half of June 1994, his convictions
for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes in relation to the killings
at Mudende University on April 8, 1994,
and at Nyundo Parish April 7–9, 1994, as
well as his convictions for crimes against
humanity and war crimes in relation to
the killing of Alphonse Kabiligi. While
the Appeals Chamber reversed his convictions for the April 7, 1994, killings in
Gisenyi Town under individual criminal
liability, finding he did not order these
crimes, the Appeals Chamber affirmed
his conviction for these killings (charged
as genocide, the crimes against humanity
of persecution and extermination, and the

war crime of violence to life) under superior responsibility. Nsengiyumva’s sentence was shortened from life in prison
to fifteen years.
The Appeals Chamber focused much
attention on the discussion of whether,
despite the fact that the defendants
could not be found guilty of ordering the
crimes, the defendants could be found
guilty pursuant to the superior responsibility mode of liability under Article 6(3)
of the ICTR Statute as a result of their
positions of authority in the military. The
Appeals Chamber held that due to the
defendants’ positions within the military,
they had a duty to prevent or punish soldiers or others under their control from
engaging in illegal acts. The Appeals
Chamber stated that “the duty to prevent
arises for a superior from the moment
he knows or has reason to know that his
subordinate is about to commit a crime,
while the duty to punish arises after the
commission of the crime.” Additionally,
the duty to prevent requires sufficient
knowledge that the crimes will occur.
In analyzing whether Bagosora had
sufficient knowledge that the crimes in
Kigali would be committed, the Appeals
Chamber looked at the “organized military nature of the attacks, his position of authority, the circumstances in
which the crimes took place, and the fact
that they occurred in Kigali where he
was based.” From this information, the
Appeals Chamber concluded the Trial
Chamber was correct in finding that
“the only reasonable inference available
from the evidence was that [Bagosora]
had actual knowledge that his subordinates were about to commit the crimes”
throughout Kigali. This knowledge triggered Bagosora’s duty to prevent and/
or punish the acts of his subordinates.
Furthermore, the Chamber made a geographical distinction between the crimes
committed in Kigali and the crimes committed in Gisenyi, finding that Bagosora
was not liable as a superior for the crimes
in Gisenyi town but was liable as a superior for similar crimes in Kigali.
In its consideration of the specific
murders against high-ranking officials, including Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, the Appeals Chamber
recounted the factors the Trial Chamber
had identified in inferring Bagosora’s
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knowledge of the impending attacks against
these victims. These included the timing of
the attacks, which started within hours of
the killing of President Habyarimana; the
systematic nature of the attacks; the prominence of the victims; and the fact that they
occurred at the time when Bagosora was at
the top of the military chain of command
and had effective control over the Rwandan
Armed Forces. Thus, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that the Trial Chamber did not
err in finding that Bagosora had the requisite knowledge that these attacks were
about to occur.
Having determined that Bagosora’s
knowledge of his subordinate’s attacks
triggered his duty to prevent or punish
these crimes, the Appeals Chamber then
examined whether Bagosora violated this
duty. The Chamber stated that a superior
meets the duty when the superior takes
necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent and punish. Applying this rule
to the facts, the Chamber concluded that
Bagosora did not meet the duty to prevent reasoning that “(i) Bagosora knew
his subordinates were about to commit
the crimes, (ii) that the military—over
which Bagosora exercised effective control—had the resources to prevent the
crimes, and (iii) that to the extent that
it lacked resources, it was because they
were deployed in executing the crimes.”
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Judgment did not formulate a reasoned
opinion on the issue of whether or not
Bagosora fulfilled his duty to punish and
instead arrived at the conclusion without
analyzing whether a reasonable attempt
to punish was undertaken. The Appeals
Chamber thus completed its own analysis and concluded that due to the short
period of time during which Bagosora
exercised effective control over the military, in combination with evidence suggesting that investigations into the crimes
may have started during Bagosora’s control, a reasonable person could not conclude that Bagosora failed to take measures to punish culpable subordinates.
The Appeals Chamber thus concluded
that while the Trial Chamber had erred in
its analysis of Bagosora’s failure to punish, the Trial Chamber had not erred in
finding him guilty under the doctrine of
superior responsibility as he had indeed
failed to prevent his subordinates’ crimes
(including genocide and rape) at Kigali
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roadblocks. Nonetheless, the Appeals
Chamber did not cite the error as a factor
in the sentence reduction.
With respect to Nsengiyumva, the
Appeals Chamber found that while he did
not order attacks in Gisenyi town, as the
Trial Chamber had ruled, he possessed
sufficient knowledge of the attacks that
his subordinates carried out in Gisenyi
town (because he was stationed there) to
be held accountable under the doctrine of
superior responsibility.
The Appeals Chamber also addressed
Bagosora’s arguments regarding his conviction for the sexual assault of the Prime
Minister. Bagosora was convicted of the
crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts” due to the fact that a bottle
was inserted into the Prime Minister’s
vagina after her death. Bagosora argued
that sexual assault can be perpetrated only
against a living person because the prohibition on sexual assault is meant to protect
the sexual integrity of a person and there is
no sexual integrity after death.
The Appeals Chamber did not answer
the legal question posed in Bagosora’s
argument regarding the applicability of
sexual assault charges to atrocities committed after the victim’s death. Rather, the
Appeals Chamber analyzed the language
of the indictment and the Trial Judgment
and considered whether or not Bagosora
was convicted of conduct for which he
was not charged, an argument the defendant had not advanced, according to the
Appeals Judgment. The Chamber stated
that while the insertion of a bottle into
the vagina of the Prime Minister after
her death “constituted a profound assault
on human dignity meriting unreserved
condemnation under international law,”
because the indictment of Bagosora read,
“Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana
was tracked down, arrested, sexually
assaulted and killed by Rwandan Army
personnel,” the indictment appeared
to describe the events as if the Prime
Minister had been sexually assaulted
prior to her death. Thus, in the view of
the Appeals Chamber, the indictment
failed to give proper notice to Bagosora
that he was charged with acts occurring
after her death. Dissenting, Judge Pocar
criticized the Chamber’s interpretation
of Bagosora’s appeal for reversing the
conviction on the basis of an issue not

raised by Bagosora. Furthermore, Judge
Pocar insisted that while the Chamber
interpreted the indictment as implying a
specific order of events, the indictment
does not actually specify whether the
sexual assault occurred before or after the
murder. Through this reasoning, Judge
Pocar concluded that Bagosora had proper
notice of the charges against him and
was not prejudiced by the wording of the
indictment.
Finally, with respect to sentencing, the
Appeal Chamber acknowledged that while
it had reversed many of the instances
in which Bagosora had been held individually criminal liable for ordering certain attacks, it affirmed his responsibility
for these acts as a superior. Noting that
superior responsibility is considered no
less grave than individual responsibility,
it concluded that this alone would not
result in a change in sentence. However,
the Appeals Chamber cited the reversal
of Bagosora’s conviction for the sexual
assault on the Prime Minister as well as
the reversal of his conviction for murder
as a crime against humanity (based on
the fact that this conviction was cumulative with the extermination conviction) as
reasons for the decrease in his sentence.
The Appeals Chamber also revisited
the sentence of Nsengiyumva. As in the
case of Bagosora, while the Appeals
Chamber granted Nsengiyumva’s
appeal on the issue of ordering, it found
Nsengiyumva guilty of the same crimes
under the doctrine of superior responsibility, thus resulting in no change to
his sentence on these grounds. However,
it did lower his sentence based on the
reversal of his conviction for murder as a
crime against humanity in relation to the
April 7, 1994, killings in Gisenyi town
because the Chamber found it was based
on the same acts as the conviction for
extermination as a crime against humanity and was, therefore, cumulative.
Kelly Brouse, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for
the Human Rights Brief. Chanté Lasco,
Jurisprudence Collections Coordinator at
the War Crimes Research Office, edited
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

53

The Prosecutor v. Ildéphonse
Nizeyimana, Case No.
ICTR-2000-55C-T
On June 19, 2012, Trial Chamber III
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda found Ildéphonse Nizeyimana
guilty on three charges: genocide; extermination and murder as crimes against
humanity; and murder as a serious violation of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
The Chamber found that beginning in
April 1994, Nizeyimana participated in
a series of joint criminal enterprises to
kill Tutsis and that he also bore superior
responsibility for all but one of the proven
killings. Notably, however, the Chamber
acquitted Nizeyimana of rape as a crime
against humanity and a war crime.
As a Captain at the École des SousOfficiers (ESO), a military-training
school in Butare, Nizeyimana served as
the intelligence and operations officer.
Although he was under the de jure command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tharcisse
Muvunyi, the Chamber concluded that
Nizeyimana exercised authority consistent with an unofficial role as second
in command at the ESO. Acting in this
capacity, Nizeyimana was found to have
planned and authorized the killings of
thousands of Tutsi refugees at Cyahinda
Parish. Nizeyimana was also found to
have participated in the establishment of
roadblocks intended to identify and kill
Tutsis, including the direct order to kill
Remy Rwekaza and Beata Uwambaye,
as well as in the attacks in the Butare
Prefecture that killed Queen Rosalie
Gicanda, Professor Pierre Claver Karenzi,
Prosecutor Jean-Baptiste Matabaro, SubPrefect Zéphanie Nyirinkwaya, and
members of the Ruhutinyanya family.
In considering the evidence of the
killings, the Chamber distinguished the
large-scale attack on Cyahinda Parish,
in which thousands of civilians—predominantly Tutsis—were massacred, and
found it to constitute extermination as
a crime against humanity. However, the
Chamber found the other instances that
involved the killings of the individuals
and families constituted the more narrow crime of murder. The Trial Chamber
noted that while “there is no numerical
threshold in establishing extermination,
case law emphasises that the killings
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must occur on a large or mass scale.”
Ultimately, with respect to the individuals and families killed, the Chamber
concluded that “the number of deaths in
each instance [was] too ambiguous or too
low to establish killing on a large scale,”
and, thus, to amount to extermination.
In reaching its conclusion, the Chamber
cited the Bagosora and Nsengiyumva
Appeal Judgment, in which the Appeals
Chamber found that the large scale
requirement could not be satisfied based
on a collection of events “in different prefectures, in different circumstances, by
different perpetrators, and over a period
of two months.” However, the Appeals
Chamber in Bagosora and Nsengiyumva
also found that a series of specific killings within Gisenyi Town that were perpetrated in parallel with other killings
throughout the town at the same time
could be aggregated to establish the
crime of extermination. Nevertheless,
the Chamber arrived at its determination
without resorting to a consideration of
Nizeyimana’s murder convictions collectively or an analysis of the geography
and timing of the smaller-scale killings.
In addition to widespread killings
of Tutsi civilians where the Chamber
held Nizeyimana guilty, the Prosecutor
was less successful with charges stemming from instances of rape and other
sexual violence crimes at the hands of

ESO soldiers over which the Prosecutor
claimed Nizeyimana exercised effective control. A major obstacle for the
Prosecution in this case was the mixture
of soldiers present at, and participating
in atrocities: ESO soldiers—over which
Nizeyimana exercised sufficient effective
control in many instances—intermingled
with Presidential Guard soldiers and gendarmerie, leading to confusion with regard
to which soldiers committed which crimes
and under whose command they were operating. Thus, the Trial Chamber was unable
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
ESO soldiers involved in the killings and
rapes at Butare University were at that time
under Nizeyimana’s control as opposed to
Presidential Guard superiors.
The insufficiency of evidence of
Nizeyimana’s control also arose in the
Chamber’s ruling regarding an attack
on Butare University Hospital, where
the Prosecutor alleged Nizeyimana bore
superior responsibility for the rape and
murders of Tutsis who sought treatment
and refuge. The Chamber found that
Presidential Guard soldiers began arriving at the hospital in mid-April and
that these soldiers played a role in the
violence against Tutsis at the hospital.
Because of the presence of soldiers under
two distinct chains of command, the
Trial Chamber concluded that the civilian witnesses were unlikely to have been
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able to distinguish between ESO and
Presidential Guard soldiers, noting that,
“[w]hile the first-hand evidence of rapes
by soldiers . . . raises the reasonable possibility that ESO soldiers raped Tutsis at
the Butare University Hospital, it is not
the only reasonable conclusion.” Thus,
the Trial Chamber found the evidence
insufficient to hold that Nizeyimana possessed superior responsibility for the
crimes committed at the hospital.
As a result of Nizeyimana’s convictions
for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, he was sentenced to life
in prison. Considerations that led the Trial
Chamber to impose this sentence included
the large number of deaths involved (especially at Cyahinda Parish), the abuse of his
authority, and the gravity of his crimes.
Because his convictions for these three
categories of crimes were all based on the
same acts, he was given a single sentence
addressing all the counts rather than three
consecutive sentences, as the Prosecution
had requested.
Yakov Bragarnik, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, wrote this judgment
summary for the Human Rights Brief.
Chanté Lasco, Jurisprudence Collections
Coordinator at the War Crimes Research
Office, edited this summary for the
Human Rights Brief.

